Skip to main content
arrow_circle_down
Xavier Gabaix
Pershing Square Professor of Economics and Finance
menu
close
Menu
Search
Search
search
Xavier Gabaix
Pershing Square Professor of Economics and Finance
Bio & CV
Classes
Publications
Breadcrumbs
Home
chevron_right
Publications
chevron_right
Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
Publication information:
Edmans, Gabaix. Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories. European Financial Management. 2009;15(3):486–496.
download_for_offline
Download citation
BibTeX
EndNote X3 XML
EndNote 7 XML
Endnote tagged
Marc
PubMedId
RIS
picture_as_pdf
PDF
